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Abstract 
We analyse the impact of the financial crisis on the structure and the dynamics of the 
Italian interbank market, focusing on monthly bank assets and liabilities data between 
January 2007 and December 2010. The analysis is developed using an ad hoc dataset based 
on supervisory reports. The data contain nominative information, which allow us to identify 
different reporting entities and counterparts. We distinguish between intra-group and extra-
group transactions, domestic and foreign counterparties, secured and unsecured positions, 
and short and long-term loans. We also analyse the relationships between large, medium and 
small groups and characterize the direction of funds between the group’s parent companies 
and the other banks in the group.  
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1.  Introduction 
1 
 
The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the structure and the dynamics of 
interbank funding in Italy focusing on monthly data between January 2007 and December 
2010. The focus of the analysis is on stocks (assets and liabilities) and not on market 
transactions. We use supervisory reports sent by Italian banks to the Bank of Italy.2 These 
data contain nominative information, which allow us to identify different reporting entities 
and counterparts. The analysis is developed using an ad hoc dataset which accounts for some 
discontinuities caused by a methodological break in supervisory reports. This allows to 
assess the impact of the crisis considering both trends that affected the entire market and 
trends that affected only specific market segments. 
Since the outbreak of the financial turmoil the interbank market has been at the centre 
of the attention of both policy makers and researchers. The market is one of the main 
channels for monetary policy transmission and a major source of contagion among financial 
institutions. Liquidity on this market depends on the credit worthiness of its participants, 
especially for unsecured loans. During the crisis the combination of liquidity hoarding by 
lenders and the perception of a “stigma effect” for borrowers reduced the role of the market 
as a source of funding for banks. 
The main facts shown in the analysis are the following. First, despite the positive trend 
of the pre-crisis period came to a halt, during the crisis there was no drastic fall of the overall 
lending and borrowing activity in the Italian interbank market. Second, while activity 
between banks belonging to the same group rose significantly, extra-group positions 
declined.  Third, we observe a drop of bilateral positions, both domestic and foreign, secured 
and unsecured, which was partly compensated by an increase in positions vis-à-vis a central 
counterpart. Fourth, although foreign bilateral assets and liabilities declined, foreign 
intermediaries continued to provide funding through foreign branches and subsidiaries of 
                                                           
1 We are especially grateful to Giorgio Gobbi, Marcello Bofondi, Massimiliano Affinito, Vincenzo 
Cavazzino and Stefano Nobili. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect the opinions of the Bank of Italy. 
2 Data from supervisory reports are also used by Mistrulli (2007) and Iazzetta and Manna (2009), who 
analyse the connections between banks, and by Affinito (2011), who studies whether the existence of interbank 
relationships attenuated the impact of the turmoil.  6 
 
Italian banks and through central counterparts. Fifth, net foreign funding of large groups 
dropped during the most intense phase of the financial crisis and recovered thereafter. On the 
contrary, during the whole period small banks received liquidity from abroad and lent to 
other domestic banks; in particular, Italian subsidiaries of foreign banks continued to borrow 
from their parent companies. Finally, parent companies of major groups, which used to 
borrow from abroad and lend to other banks of the group, during the crisis reduced 
significantly their role as provider of intra-group liquidity and their net position became 
negative. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The second section presents the main 
characteristics of the Italian interbank market. The third section describes the dataset. The 
fourth analyses the impact of the crisis on interbank balance sheet positions, distinguishing 
between assets and liabilities. We focus on the riskier segments of the market in order to 
assess the effects of the turmoil where we expect them to be more evident. In particular, we 
concentrate on extra-group positions and further decompose the extra-group segment 
between domestic and foreign counterparties and between secured and unsecured loans. We 
also analyse the evolution of positions by maturity. Section 5 characterizes the direction of 
funds between different types of intermediaries. We analyse the relationships between large, 
medium and small groups, also distinguishing between foreign and central counterparts. The 
sixth section focuses on the 5 largest Italian groups and analyses separately positions held by 
the group leader and those accounted for by the other banks of the group. Section 7 
concludes the paper and sums up the main evidences obtained with the analysis.  
2.  The Italian interbank market 
2.1   Instruments and markets 
The interbank monetary market allows banks to exchange short-term funds between 
each other through different financial instruments. The money market instruments used by 
Italian banks are deposits, repurchase agreements (repos) and certificates of deposits. At the 
end of 2010 deposits represented more than 80% of total interbank positions, of which 1/3 
had overnight maturity. Repos accounted for slightly less than 20% of the total, certificate of 
deposits were a negligible fraction of the total. A broader definition of the relationships on 7 
 
the interbank market includes also derivative contracts, but we are not able to include them 
in our analysis since they are off balance sheet instruments.
3  
Instruments can be either traded on regulated markets or over-the-counter (OTC). In 
Italy an important electronic broker for unsecured deposits is the e-MID, which is supervised 
by the Bank of Italy.
4 Other relevant regulated markets are the MTS-general collateral and 
the MTS-special repo, segments of the MTS market where banks exchange repos based 
respectively on a (standardised) General Collateral or a specific collateral agreed by the 
counterparties. 
Transactions are either conducted on a bilateral basis (like OTC and e-MID 
transactions) or through a central counterpart. In Italy the main central counterpart is Cassa 
Compensazione e Garanzia (CC&G), a clearing house funded in 1992, now belonging to the 
London Stock Exchange Group. CC&G operates in a number of regulated markets, such as 
the MTS. The presence of a central counterpart reduces counterparty risk, ensuring at the 
same time the anonymity of transactions. 
While OTC transactions and operations with a central counterpart ensure anonymity 
with respect to other market participants, transactions on the e-MID are transparent, meaning 
that the identity of counterparts is known. During the crisis the perception of a high “stigma 
effect” led borrowers to prefer anonymous markets over transparent ones; as a consequence 
the role of the e-MID in the interbank market decreased significantly. Since the beginning of 
the crisis the share of very short term transactions (overnight, tomorrow-next and spot-next) 
on the e-MID over the sum of e-MID and OTC transactions dropped from 2/3 to 1/3.
5 
The contraction of interbank transactions made the Bank of Italy intervene with the 
creation in February 2009 of the Mercato Interbancario Collateralizzato (MIC), with the 
aim to foster recovery on the interbank circuits minimizing counterparty and liquidity risks. 
                                                           
3 See European Central Bank (2008) for an analysis that includes future and option markets in the Eurozone 
interbank market. 
4 Angelini, Nobili, and Picillo  (2010) used e-MID data to evaluate the impact of the crisis on this market.  
5 See Bank of Italy (2010). 8 
 
Transactions on this market are anonymous and are guaranteed by a central counterpart (the 
Bank of Italy until December 2010, the CC&G thereafter).
6  
Our dataset allows us to have a comprehensive picture of the whole interbank market. 
We observe banks’ balance sheet positions in deposits, repos and certificates of deposits, 
resulting from transactions executed on both regulated markets (such as e-MID, MTS, and 
MIC) and OTC markets. Data include both secured and unsecured instruments and 
transactions conducted either with a central counterpart or vis-à-vis other banks.  
2.2  The structure of the market 
Table 1 shows the structure of the interbank market before and after the crisis reporting 
both assets and liabilities. The overall interbank activity is divided between intra-group and 
extra-group operations; the latter are then broken down between positions vis-à-vis domestic, 
foreign and central counterparts, as well as between secured and unsecured transactions. This 
partition of the market is used in the following sections to analyse the impact of the crisis on 
interbank relationships. 
The table shows that in the interbank market most transactions take place between 
banks belonging to the same group. Moreover, the role of the intra-group segment increased 
during the crisis, probably because it is less sensitive to counterparty risk. In particular, the 
share of intra-group assets over total interbank exposures grew from 65% in January 2007 to 
70% in October 2010. 
Foreign transactions make up for a significant part of the market. Following a period 
characterized by a tendency towards a greater internationalization
7, the role of foreign 
counterparts declined somewhat during the crisis. In the e-MID transactions by foreign 
intermediaries grew considerably up to 2007, when they reached a share of 60%, and 
dropped drastically afterwards. Similarly, our data show that from 2007 to 2010 assets 
                                                           
6 Since January 2011, the MIC has been substituted by the new-MIC, a segment of the e-MID where the 
role of the Bank of Italy as a central counterpart is replaced by that of the CC&G. For a description of the MIC 
and the new-MIC see Bank of Italy (2010).  
7 See European Central Bank (2008). 9 
 
towards foreign counterparts dropped from around 50% to 40% of total extra-group balance 
sheet positions.  
Table 1 













Intra-group 347 65 437 74 406 63 531 66
of which: 
foreign branches and 
subsidiaries
36 10 28 6 111 27 110 21
Extra-group 191 35 157 26 241 37 279 34
of which: 
central counterparts 10 5 32 20 11 5 83 30
domestic counterparts 80 42 58 37 90 37 73 26
foreign counterparts 101 53 67 43 140 58 122 44
secured 102 53 58 37 60 25 133 48
unsecured 89 47 99 63 181 75 146 52
Total 538 100 594 100 647 100 810 100
Assets Liabilities
January 2007 October 2010 (2) January 2007 October 2010 (2)
 
Source: Bank of Italy - Supervisory reports. 
(1) Balance sheet positions include only money market instruments (deposits, repurchase agreements and 
certificates of deposits). (2) We report data as of October 2010 because of a discontinuity in the data in 
November 2010, caused by a merging operation within a major group. 
 
The weight of central counterparts (CC&G and the Bank of Italy) in the interbank 
market used to be negligeable before the crisis. However, it increased rapidly thereafter 
during the last two years, going from 5% to 20% of total extra-group assets. In the same 
period, the share of secured assets decreased (from 50% to almost 40%) while that of 
secured liabilities rose (from 25% to almost 50%). 
The activity on the interbank market is quite concentrated. The role played by the main 
banks mirrors their weight in the Italian banking system. The top 5 groups (Unicredit, Intesa-
San Paolo, Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Banco Popolare, and Unione di Banche Italiane) 
represents around 65% of total positions, more than 90% of intra-group transactions, and 10 
 
about 50% of transactions with foreign counterparts. Their role consolidated during the 
crisis.  
3.  Data source 
We use data from banks’ supervisory reports. Reports are compiled monthly by all 
Italian banks and contain a snapshot of banks’ balance-sheet composition at the end of the 
reporting month. We extract data for assets and liabilities towards other banks or central 
counterparts that are recorded separately from assets and liabilities towards customers, 
central banks and other entities. We include only money market instruments, specifically 
deposits, repurchase agreements and certificates of deposits, regardless of the market where 
the transaction has taken place.  
We consider positions of all Italian banks, with the exception of Italian branches of 
foreign banks.
8 Italian banks controlled by foreign groups are instead included and their 
transaction with foreign banks belonging to the same group are classified as extra-group. The 
dataset includes positions vis-à-vis all bank counterparts, both domestic and foreign, as well 
as operations through a central counterpart, which allow us to control for indirect 
connections between banks. 
Assets and liabilities towards other banks are reported either identifying different 
counterparts (“nominative data”) or aggregating across them (“anonymous data”). Whenever 
possible we use nominative data, which provide a comprehensive picture of the connections 
across banks. 
Data from supervisory reports display a discontinuity between November 2008 and 
December 2008, due to a methodological break in data collection methods. There are two 
main sources of discontinuity. First, nominative positions towards foreign branches of Italian 
banks started to be recorded only after November 2008. Second, a new classification of 
maturities and instruments was adopted. To compare data before and after the December 
2008 break, using most of the available information at the nominative level, we had to rely 
on anonymous data for all positions with foreign banks until November 2008. 
                                                           
8 Italian branches of foreign banks are excluded as reporting entities, but included as counterparts. 11 
 
4.  The impact of the financial crisis on interbank assets and liabilities 
Figure 1 (panel A) shows that at the end of 2008 the liabilities of Italian banks versus 
the Eurosystem increased drastically, reflecting the generalized search for liquidity that 
characterized the system after the failure of Lehman Brothers. The effect was only partly 
absorbed during the following year. In this section we will analyse how this liquidity shock 
affected other interbank positions.  
Figure 1 (Panel B) shows that the crisis interrupted the positive trend that characterized 
interbank balance sheet positions in the previous period; however, it also shows that the 
crisis did not cause any drastic fall in the overall interbank lending activity, even during the 
most acute phase of the turmoil. Between January 2007 and December 2008 both assets and 
liabilities rose by 18%, from about 540 to 630 billions and from 650 to 770 billions of euros, 
respectively. Thereafter, both remained stable or decreased slightly. An exceptionally high 
value was reported in October 2008, caused by a single extraordinary liquidity operation 
which took place between two banks of a large banking group; a large drop was instead 
reported in November 2010, reflecting an intra-group merging operation. 
As only Italian banks are included as reporting entities, when we aggregate assets and 
liabilities positions between Italian banks are netted away while those between Italian and 
foreign banks are not. Therefore, the mismatch between assets and liabilities measures the 
net position of Italian banks towards foreign counterparties.
9 Figure 1 (Panel B) shows that 
Italian banks were net borrowers from abroad: the difference between assets and liabilities 
was negative throughout the period and fell from around -120 billions at the end of 2007 to -
230 billions in December 2010. Foreign net positions are composed by an intra-group part 
(Italian banks’ positions vis-à-vis their foreign branches or subsidiaries) and an extra-group 
one (exposures towards foreign banks and Italian branches of foreign banks). Extra-group 
net positions also include those vis-à-vis central counterparts, which can be different from 
zero for the part related to foreign intermediaries. The contribution and the dynamics of each 
of these three components of foreign net funding will be analyzed separately in the following 
sections.
                                                           
9 Differences between assets and liabilities may be also due to minor discrepancies in reported cross 




Italian banks’ assets and liabilities (billions  €) 
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Source: Bank of Italy - supervisory reports.  
Note: Balance sheet positions include only money market instruments (deposits, repurchase 
agreements and certificates of deposits). In panel B the differences between assets and 
liabilities are due to net positions vis-à-vis foreign banks and to discrepancies in reported 
cross positions. The high value in October 2008 is caused by a single extraordinary liquidity 
operation; the drop in November 2010 is caused by a merging operation within a major 
group. 13 
 
In order to better assess the effects of the financial turmoil on interbank funding we 
now turn to disaggregated data. Specifically, we analyse the impact of the crisis on those 
segments of the interbank market which are more exposed to counterparty risk. We start with 
extra-group positions and then we further decompose this segment between positions vis-à-
vis foreign and domestic counterparties, secured and unsecured loans, overnight and longer-
term instruments. 
4.1    Intra-group versus extra-group positions 
We expect that the financial turmoil had a stronger impact on the extra-group segment 
of the interbank market, that is on transactions between banks not belonging to the same 
group. The extra-group segment is generally more exposed to counterparty risk than the 
intra-group one, as it is more sensitive to problems of asymmetric information. However, 
one should consider that extra-group exposures include also positions with central 
counterparts, specifically the CC&G and the Bank of Italy (on the MIC), for which there is 
practically no counterpart risk.
10  
Figure 2 
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Source: Bank of Italy - supervisory reports. 
Note: The low value in October 2008 is caused by a single extraordinary liquidity operation; the 
jump in November 2010 is caused by a merging operation within a major group. 
                                                           
10 Positions on the MIC and those involving the CC&G are considered extra-group transactions because of 
the anonymity of the counterparty. 14 
 
Figure 2 plots the shares of extra-group assets and liabilities over the sum of intra and 
extra-group positions. The first fact to observe is the prevalence of the intra-group segment, 
which includes both positions with domestic banks and those with foreign branches and 
subsidiaries. Intra-group positions averaged around 450 billions over the sample period, as 
opposed to 200 billions of extra-group ones. As we will see in section 6, the size of the intra-
group segment reflects the prevailing role of the major groups on the Italian interbank 
market.  
Second, the figure shows that the shares of extra-group assets and liabilities declined 
sharply between 2008 and mid-2009, from around 40% to 25%, and started to increase again 
at the end of 2009. The decline in extra-group positions is presumably a consequence of the 
sharp increase in counterparty risk during the crisis, given that extra-group relationships are 
riskier than intra-group ones.
11  
Figure 3 (panel A and B) shows separately assets and liabilities for both intra-group 
and extra-group positions. Coherently with our expectations, the decline in the share of 
extra-group positions is due both to the increase of intra-group volumes and to the decrease 
of extra-group ones. In the next section we will see that within the extra-group segment, the 
fall of bilateral operations was partly compensated by the rise in positions with central 
counterparts.  
Extra-group lending and borrowing displayed some differences in their dynamics. On 
the one side, liabilities show significant reductions just after the main events of the crisis: its 
beginning (August 2007), Bear Sterns failure (March 2008), Lehman Brothers failure 
(September 2008). On the other side, assets started to decline only in the second half of 
2008. More interestingly, in 2010 while assets remained at relatively low levels liabilities 
recovered, reaching volumes similar to those prevailing before the crisis. In section 4.2 we 
will see that the positive trend of liabilities in 2010 is mainly due to the increase in secured 
borrowing from central counterparts. This trend suddenly stopped in May 2010, possibly in 
connection with tensions on the public debt of some European countries. 
                                                           
11 Data presented in tables and figures are not corrected for mergers and acquisitions, but we checked that 
the drop is not explained by such operations. We controlled for mergers and acquisition by using the 
compositions of groups as of the end of the sample period. 15 
 
Figure 3 
Intra and extra-group positions (billions  €) 
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Source: Bank of Italy - supervisory reports. 
Note: The difference between assets and liabilities differs from “foreign net funding” because it also 
includes discrepancies in reported cross positions. In panel A, the high value in October 2008 is caused 
by a single extraordinary liquidity operation; the jump in November 2010 reflects a merging operation 





Figure 3 also shows net funding from foreign branches and subsidiaries (panel A) and 
that from banks belonging to foreign banks (panel B). We observe that Italian banks 
borrowed heavily from both type of foreign counterparts. However, while funding from 
foreign branches and subsidiaries increased starting from the beginning of the crisis and 
remained stable during the second half of 2010, borrowing from other foreign banks reduced 
initially, until the end of 2008, and increased in the following period. 
4.2  Domestic, foreign and central counterparts  
This section analyses the relation between the Italian banking system and foreign 
counterparts and checks how it has evolved since the outbreak of the financial turmoil. We 
expect the impact of the crisis to be more evident when transactions with foreign 
counterparties are analysed as they imply higher counterparty risk. 
We focus exclusively on the extra-group segment, which, as we have just seen, is the 
area of the market that has suffered the crisis the most. Relationships of Italian banks with 
their foreign branches and subsidiaries are therefore excluded. We will come back to them in 
section 5, when we will analyse intra-group funding in a greater detail.  
Figure 4 
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Source: Bank of Italy  supervisory reports. 
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Figure 4 shows the shares of foreign lending and borrowing over the sum of domestic, 
foreign and central counterpart transactions. As expected, the crisis had a major impact on 
both foreign assets and liabilities. It interrupted a tendency towards a greater 
internationalization that had characterized the interbank market in the previous years. The 
shares of foreign lending and borrowing dropped respectively from about 50% and 60% at 
the beginning of 2007 to around 45% in December 2010.  
Figure 5 (panel A through C) compares assets and liabilities vis-à-vis domestic, foreign 
and central counterparts. Interestingly, we see that the crisis affected negatively both 
domestic and foreign positions. Domestic positions fell from 100 billions euro, just before 
the failure of Lehman Brothers, to 50 billions at the end of 2009 (Figure 5, panel A). Foreign 
transactions were hit earlier than domestic ones: lending towards foreign counterparties 
decreased from about 125 billions in the first quarter of 2008 down to 50 billions in August 
2009; during the same period, borrowing from foreign counterparts declined from just 
around 160 to 100 billions (Figure 5, panel B).  
The drop in bilateral positions (both domestic and foreign) was compensated by a 
significant increase in central counterpart transactions (Figure 5, panel C). The role of 
central counterparts rapidly soared since June 2008 − with an acceleration after March 2009 
− mitigating the impact of the financial turmoil on the extra-group segment. Aggregate 
volumes exchanged with CC&G in May 2010 were fifteen times bigger than in November 
2007.
 Positions on the MIC grew steadily from the beginning of operation until May 2010, 
when they stabilized. Since the first month of its opening MIC volumes increased up to 
twelve times. 
The growth of central counterparts reflects the willingness of lenders to attenuate 
counterparty risk as well as the preference of borrowers for anonymous transactions over 
transparent ones. More and more transactions have been executed through a central 
counterpart in order to avoid the “stigma effect” which characterized the market during the 
crisis.
12  
                                                           
12 The increase in transactions with a central counterpart also reflects the possibility, since November 2009, 
of using a central counterpart for overnight repo contracts as well.  18 
 
Figure 5 
Extra-group volumes: domestic, foreign and central counterparts (billions €) 
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Source: Bank of Italy - supervisory reports. 
Note: In panel A the differences between assets and liabilities are due to 
discrepancies in reported cross positions, in panel B and C to net positions vis-
à-vis foreign banks. 19 
 
Though foreign bilateral positions declined during the crisis, foreign banks continued 
to play a significant part in the interbank market. The difference between assets and 
liabilities vis-à-vis foreign counterparts shows that after the reduction in the first part of the 
crisis bilateral net borrowing rose again in 2009, as the worst effects of the turmoil were 
fading away and stabilized in the second half of 2010 (Figure 5, panel B). At the same time, 
a complete evaluation of the contribution of foreign banks should take into account that: i) 
since the end of 2009 foreign intermediaries lent to domestic banks also by taking positions 
with the central counterparts (Figure 5, panel C); ii) foreign branches and subsidiaries 
increased their role as provider of liquidity at the intra-group level (Figure 3, panel A).
13  
4.3   Secured versus unsecured positions 
A priori, it is not clear how the crisis should have impacted on secured funding. 
Secured instruments have costs and benefits. From the lender’s perspective, they are less 
exposed to counterparty risk than unsecured ones, as they involve the pledge of a collateral; 
from the borrower’s perspective, they bear lower interest rates but, at the same time, require 
the immobilization of assets. Therefore, on the one side increasing counterparty risk might 
have boosted the use of collateralized transactions, on the other side higher cost of collateral 
might have favoured the recourse to unsecured instruments. 
The increase in intra-group transactions we documented in section 4.1 can be seen as 
an attempt to reduce the recourse to costly secured borrowing. The share of secured 
operations over total intra-group ones is in fact quite low (about 20%) compared to that in 
the extra-group segment. To better assess the effects of the crisis on collateralized 
transactions, in this section we restrict our attention to extra-group lending and borrowing. 
Figure 6 shows that the shares of secured positions over the sum of secured and unsecured 
ones decreased or remained stable in the first part of the crisis and increased rapidly − 
especially liabilities − after the failure of Lehman Brothers (from 20%-30% to 45%). 
 
                                                           
13 Balance sheet positions of Italian banks vis-à-vis foreign branches and subsidiaries were quite stable over 
time (around 160 billion) and the share over the whole market increased from 27% in January 2007 to 32% in 
September 2009; it decreased back to 26% in 2010.  20 
 
Figure 6 






2007 2008 2009 2010
Liabilities Assets
 
Source: Bank of Italy - supervisory reports. 
 
The increase in secured operations was probably not driven by a generalized search for 
security, following the perception of higher counterparty risk, but more specifically by the 
preference for anonymous transactions over transparent ones. This can be seen from Figure 7 
(panel A through C). While operations with central counterparts increased, bilateral 
collateralized positions (repos) actually declined or remained stable. The portion of secured 
assets accounted for by the CC&G and the MIC rose from just above 10% in the last quarter 
of 2008 to just below 60% in October 2010. 
If we focus on bilateral collateralized positions, excluding central counterparts, we see 
that the dynamics of assets and liabilities are somewhat mixed (Figure 7, panels B and C). 
On the liability side, Italian banks reduced unsecured borrowing, but continued to obtain 
funding through collateralized transactions. In particular, unsecured liabilities reduced from 
about 250 to 150 billions, while secured ones remained stable, at around 40. On the asset 
side, instead, the contraction was far more pronounced for secured (from 100 to 25 billions 




Secured versus unsecured extra-group positions (billions  €) 
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Source: Bank of Italy - supervisory reports. 
Note: The differences between assets and liabilities are due to net positions 
vis-à-vis  foreign banks and to discrepancies in reported cross positions. 22 
 
Figure 8 
Secured bilateral positions: domestic and foreign counterparts (billions €)  
 






2007 2008 2009 2010
Assets Liabilities
 






2007 2008 2009 2010
Assets Liabilities
 
Source: Bank of Italy - supervisory reports. 
Note: The differences between assets and liabilities are due to discrepancies in 
reported cross positions for domestic counterparts (panel A) and to net positions vis-à-
vis foreign banks for foreign counterparts (panel B). 
 
The decline in the most acute phase of the crisis in both secured and unsecured 
bilateral operations is mostly explained by transactions with foreign counterparts. In the 
most acute phase of the turmoil, as the price of counterparty risk rose, Italian banks reduced 
foreign transactions more than domestic ones, because the former were perceived as riskier. 
As Italian banks used to borrow unsecured and lend secured vis-à-vis foreign counterparts, 
the contraction affected mostly unsecured liabilities and secured assets. Figure 8 (panel A 
and B) focuses on secured transactions and plots separately foreign and domestic positions. 23 
 
We see that although secured assets declined for both domestic and foreign counterparts, the 
drop was much more pronounced for the latter.  
4.4   Interbank positions by maturity  
In this section the maturity breakdown of extra-group positions is analyzed. We focus 
on deposits, which is the only instrument for which we have a detailed and consistent 
maturity information since December 2008.  
Figure 9 










Source: Bank of Italy - supervisory reports. 
 
Deposits are the most common instrument for interbank borrowing and lending. They 
accounted on average for 70% of extra-group positions during our sample period and for 
more than 90% of intra-group volumes. About 30% of the deposits have very short 
maturities (overnight or sight deposits).  
We expect funding with longer maturities to react more sharply to the crisis, given the 
higher liquidity risk implied by long term transactions. Figure 9 shows that the share of 
deposits with very short maturities over total interbank deposits increased during the crisis. 
In particular, from December 2008 the share of overnight and sight deposits rose from about 
25% to a peak of 40% in May 2010 for assets, while moved around 25-30% for liabilities. 24 
 
5.  Net funding relations by group size and domicile of the counterparts 
In this section we analyse the direction of funding in the interbank market. The 
objective is to describe how liquidity moves across different types of banks and to check 
whether the structure of such relationships has suffered significant alterations. We restrict 
our attention to lending and borrowing transactions that take place between banks that do not 
belong to the same group, which is the market segment that experienced a significant 
contraction during the most critical phases of the crisis (see section 3.1). Intra-group net 
positions are instead analyzed in section 6. 
As a first step banks are grouped in to 3 categories according to their size: “large 
banks” (UniCredit, Intesa Sanpaolo, Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Banco Popolare, and Unione 
di Banche Italiane), “medium size banks”, and “small banks”. We also divide counterparties 
between domestic, foreign, and central counterparts and distinguish domestic counterparts 
according to the three size classes specified above.
14  
All types of banks had negative net positions for most of the period and borrowed 
mainly from foreign banks. Overall, the financial turmoil has not severely impaired the 
ability of the Italian banking system to obtain liquidity on the international markets.  
During the crisis large banks reduced net funding, that remained at relatively low 
levels until the end of 2009. In 2010, they increasingly borrowed from foreign banks and 
central counterparts; these inflows were only partly offset by lending to other domestic 
banks. The overall net position decreased in the first half of 2010 and stabilized thereafter. 
Medium size banks received liquidity from both foreign intermediaries and domestic small 
banks; in 2010 they also borrowed from large banks. Net funding from abroad of medium 
size banks decreased during the most acute phase of the turmoil and rose back starting in the 
second half of 2009; net funding from domestic banks remained basically unchanged. Small 
banks borrowed increasingly from abroad and provided liquidity to other domestic banks, 
mainly medium size banks. Foreign borrowing by medium and small size banks is mainly 
due to Italian subsidiaries obtaining funds from their foreign parent companies. 
                                                           
14 Banks that do not belong to any conglomerate are considered bank groups composed by one entity only. 
The classification into size classes is built upon that adopted by the Bank of Italy. Large banks belong to major 
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6.  Funding relations within major bank groups 
So far intra-group funding was excluded from the analysis. Here intra-group relations 
are studied to describe liquidity flows across banks of the same group. Attention is restricted 
on the 5 largest Italian groups (UniCredit, Intesa Sanpaolo, Monte dei Paschi di Siena, 
Banco Popolare, and Unione di Banche Italiane). 
These groups give a comprehensive insight of intra-groups dynamics, given their 
dimensions and their relevance for the interbank market. During the period under analysis 
the largest five groups together held on average almost 65% of all interbank positions. The 
two most active groups accounted for about a half of total positions, while the remaining 
three groups account for about 15%. Their overall share in the extra-group segment 
oscillated around 30%; that in the intra-group was around 90%. These banks also played a 
central role in transactions with foreign counterparties. In October 2010 about 40% of extra-
group assets and liabilities vis-à-vis foreign intermediaries was concentrated in the hands of 
the top five groups. 
Figure 10 shows the average share of assets and liabilities held by group leaders (the 
group’s parent companies) in the intra-group and extra-group segments. Interbank positions 
appear quite concentrated in the balance sheets of group leaders. In the intra-group segment 
the average share of liabilities held by group leaders increased during the first months of the 
crisis, from 40% to over 55%, and remained stable thereafter; the share of assets instead 
declined from around 65% to 55%. In the extra-group segment the share of both assets and 





                                                                                                                                                                                   
Italian groups. Medium size banks include groups and independent banks with total assets ranging between 
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Source: Bank of Italy - supervisory reports. 
Note: Quarterly averages of monthly data. Monthly data are averages across the 5 top Italian groups. 
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Figure 11 shows quarterly net positions of group leaders and other banks vis-à-vis 
different types of counterparties. In particular, counterparties are divided in four classes: 
other domestic banks belonging to the same group, foreign branches or subsidiaries of the 
group, other domestic banks not belonging to the group, and foreign banks. The picture 
allows to analyse the dynamics of intra-group funding relationships. We find the following 
patterns. Group leaders borrowed mainly from foreign branches and subsidiaries of the 
group and to a lesser extent from other foreign banks. At the same time they almost 
exclusively lent to other banks of the group, while net positions vis-à-vis other domestic 
groups were modest.  
During the crisis the role of the group leader changed significantly, as it ceased to be 
the reference entity for the funding of the group. In particular, starting from the second half 
of 2008 we observe a sharp decline of the leader’s net lending to other banks of the group. 
This change was only partially offset by a decline in net borrowing from foreign banks and 
produced a worsening of the leader’s net position; this turned deeply negative in the second 
part of 2008 and remained at low levels thereafter. 
7.  Conclusions  
The paper uses banks’ balance sheet assets and liabilities in order to analyse how the 
crisis impacted on interbank funding relationships. To this purpose we use an ad hoc 
database which solves some methodological discontinuities in supervisory reports. 
The analysis shows that the crisis had a clear negative impact on interbank funding, 
though there was no drastic fall in the overall interbank activity. In particular, we observe 
that interbank balance sheet positions shifted towards safer segments, like the intra-group 
segment, relations with central counterparts, and short-term instruments.  
During the crisis there was a massive increase in volumes exchanged within groups. 
This increase (about 230 billions from the beginning of 2007 to October 2010) was caused 
principally by the two largest Italian groups that are responsible for more than the 65% of the 
overall intra-group volumes. At the same time, the financial turmoil hit strongly the extra-
group segment of the market which is characterized by higher counterparty risk.  29 
 
The decline in extra-group total positions conceals some important changes in their 
composition. First of all, bilateral positions dropped, while those with central counterparties 
increased. The “stigma effect” which characterized the markets during the crisis period 
caused borrowers to prefer transactions executed through a central counterpart over bilateral 
ones. At the same time, as counterparty risk rose, both secured and unsecured assets 
declined. Italian banks reduced bilateral operations with foreign counterparts, perceived as 
riskier, more than those with domestic ones. 
While bilateral positions declined during the crisis, foreign banks continued to play a 
significant part in the interbank market. Net funding from foreign intermediaries through 
bilateral positions declined until 2008 and recovered thereafter. Net borrowing through 
central counterparts increased until the end 2010 and reduced in the following months. Net 
inflows from foreign branches and subsidiaries surged during the first part of the crisis and 
stabilized starting from 2009. 
We characterize the direction of funds between different types of intermediaries: 
domestic versus foreign banks, small versus large groups. The analysis shows that during the 
crisis large and medium size banks reduced the absorption of liquidity from abroad. At the 
same time, Italian subsidiaries of foreign groups continued to obtain funds from their parent 
companies abroad.  
Finally, the analysis of intra-group relationships highlights the role of the group’s 
parent company. Group leaders mainly borrowed from their foreign branches and 
subsidiaries and lent to other banks of the group. We show, however, that during the crisis 
group leaders reduced significantly their role as provider of intra-group liquidity. 
The analysis conducted so far shows the potential of data from supervisory reports in 
studying the developments of the interbank funding. Nominative data are extremely valuable 
as they make possible to track all interbank connections between Italian credit institutions. 
At the same time, data exhibit some limitation. First, there is a methodological discontinuity 
which need to be addressed. Second, information about financial instruments and maturities 
are often not sufficiently detailed. Instruments are grouped into macro areas that make 
difficult, for instance, to discern between liquidity management instruments and credit lines.  30 
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